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Abstract	It	has	been	proposed	that	humans	possess	an	automatic	system	to	represent	mental	states	(‘implicit	mentalizing’).	The	existence	of	an	implicit	mentalizing	system	has	generated	considerable	debate	however,	centred	on	the	ability	of	various	experimental	paradigms	to	demonstrate	unambiguously	such	mentalizing.		Evidence	for	implicit	mentalizing	has	previously	been	provided	by	the	‘dot	perspective	task’,	where	participants	are	slower	to	verify	the	number	of	dots	they	can	see	when	an	avatar	can	see	a	different	number	of	dots.		However,	recent	evidence	challenged	a	mentalizing	interpretation	of	this	effect	by	showing	it	was	unaltered	when	the	avatar	was	replaced	with	an	inanimate	arrow	stimulus.	Here	we	present	an	extension	of	the	dot	perspective	task	using	an	invisibility	cloaking	device	to	render	the	dots	invisible	on	certain	trials.		This	paradigm	is	capable	of	providing	unambiguous	evidence	of	automatic	mentalizing,	but	no	such	evidence	was	found.		Two	further	well-powered	experiments	used	opaque	and	transparent	goggles	to	manipulate	visibility	but	found	no	evidence	of	automatic	mentalizing,	nor	of	individual	differences	in	empathy	or	perspective-taking	predicting	performance,	contradicting	previous	studies	using	the	same	design.	The	results	cast	doubt	on	the	existence	of	an	implicit	mentalizing	system,	suggesting	that	previous	effects	were	due	to	domain-general	processes.			
Keywords:	Visual	perspective	taking;	implicit	mentalizing;	theory	of	mind;	domain-general	processing,	submentalizing.		
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Statement	of	the	public	significance	of	the	work:	The	ability	to	represent	in	one’s	own	mind	what	other	people	see,	think,	or	believe	is	important	for	social	interactions	and	relationships.	There	is	wide	agreement	that	this	‘mentalizing’	ability	depends	on	a	late	developing,	slow	and	effortful	system,	but	much	debate	on	whether	humans	also	possess	a	fast	and	automatic	mentalizing	system.	The	present	studies	tested	whether	participants	automatically	represented	what	an	onscreen	human	avatar	could	see.	Objects’	visibility	was	manipulated	by	using	either	a	set	of	telescopes	or	goggles.	One	of	each	set	allowed	objects	to	be	seen,	and	the	other	did	not.	Participant	response	times	were	predicted	to	be	faster	when	what	they	saw	corresponded	to	what	the	avatar	saw,	and	slower	when	there	was	a	difference.	However,	this	did	not	occur,	providing	no	evidence	for	an	automatic	mentalizing	system,	suggesting	rather	that	representing	others’	mental	states	is	effortful	not	automatic.		
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Introduction	Mentalizing	(also	known	as	‘theory	of	mind’)	refers	to	the	ascription	of	mental	states,	such	as	beliefs	and	intentions,	to	oneself	and	others.		Mentalizing	plays	a	crucial	role	in	social	interactions,	particularly	when	seeking	to	predict,	understand,	or	explain	another’s	behavior.	While	the	existence	of	a	late-developing,	cognitively	demanding,	ability	to	represent	mental	states	in	human	adults	and	older	children	is	almost	universally	accepted,	there	has	been	considerable	debate	regarding	the	existence	of	an	earlier,	more	automatic	and	efficient	route	by	which	infants	and	non-human	animals	may	represent	beliefs,	or	even	‘belief-like’	states	(Apperly	&	Butterfill,	2009;	Butterfill	&	Apperly,	2013).	This	debate	has	largely	been	methodological	in	nature,	with	several	authors	claiming	evidence	for	an	automatic	mentalizing	system	(sometimes	described	as	an	'implicit	mentalizing'	system	-	Kovács,	Téglás,	&	Endress,	2010;	Qureshi,	Apperly,	&	Samson,	2010;	Samson,	Apperly,	Braithwaite,	Andrews,	&	Bodley	Scott,	2010;	Senju,	Southgate,	Snape,	Leonard,	&	Csibra,	2011),	while	others	have	provided	alternative	explanations	for	the	effects	claimed	to	support	the	existence	of	such	a	system	(Heyes,	2014a;	Phillips	et	al.,	2015;	Santiesteban,	Catmur,	Hopkins,	Bird,	&	Heyes,	2014;	Cole,	Atkinson,	Le,	&	Smith,	2016).		 In	adults,	the	‘dot	perspective	task’	has	provided	some	of	the	strongest	evidence	that	mentalizing	can	occur	automatically	(Qureshi	et	al.,	2010;	Samson	et	al.,	2010).	Participants	are	presented	with	an	image	of	a	blue	room	with	red	dots	on	the	wall.	In	the	centre	a	human	avatar	faces	towards	the	right	or	left	wall.	Participants	are	asked	to	verify	if	a	given	number	cue	matches	the	number	of	red	
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dots	they	themselves	can	see	on	the	walls	of	the	room.	Importantly,	they	are	instructed	to	ignore	the	avatar	and	respond	based	on	their	own	visual	perspective.	On	consistent	trials	the	number	of	dots	the	participant	and	avatar	can	see	is	the	same;	on	inconsistent	trials	the	participant	and	avatar	see	a	different	number	of	dots	(because	some	of	the	dots	are	positioned	behind	the	avatar).	Despite	being	told	to	ignore	the	avatar,	participants	respond	faster	on	consistent	trials	than	on	inconsistent	trials.	This	‘consistency	effect’	has	been	interpreted	as	evidence	for	automatic	mentalizing:	that	the	avatar’s	visual	perspective	(i.e.	mental	state)	is	automatically	processed	in	addition	to	the	participant’s	own.	It	is	suggested	that	on	inconsistent	trials,	resolution	of	the	conflict	between	the	participant’s	and	avatar’s	visual	perspectives	extends	response	times.			 A	limitation	of	the	original	dot	perspective	task’s	ability	to	provide	evidence	of	automatic	mentalizing	is	that	it	did	not	include	a	control	condition	that	could	test	an	alternative	‘submentalizing’	hypothesis	(Heyes,	2014a).	If	mentalizing	causes	the	consistency	effect,	then	the	effect	should	not	be	observed	when	the	central	stimulus	is	not	an	appropriate	target	for	the	attribution	of	mental	states.	However,	a	recent	paper	(Santiesteban	et	al.,	2014)	demonstrated	that	the	same	consistency	effect	is	observed	when	the	central	stimulus	is	an	arrow	rather	than	an	avatar.	These	data	raise	the	question	of	whether	the	automatic	process	generating	the	consistency	effect	involves	mentalizing	-	specifically,	representation	of	what	others	can	see	-	or	a	domain-general	non-mentalistic	process	where,	for	example,	the	eyes/nose	of	the	avatar	and	the	
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point	of	the	arrow	act	as	directional	cues	that	automatically	orientate	participants’	attention	to	a	subset	of	the	dots,	slowing	responding	on	inconsistent	trials	(Santiesteban	et	al.,	2014;	Catmur,	Santiesteban,	Conway,	Heyes,	&	Bird,	2016).	A	new	experimental	manipulation	is	therefore	required	to	find	positive	evidence	of	automatic	mentalizing	in	the	avatar	condition.		 Heyes	(1998;	2014b,	2014c)	proposed	such	a	method,	known	as	the	‘goggles	test’,	that	has	provided	the	strictest	test	of	mentalizing	to	date.	The	goggles	test	is	the	most	refined	of	a	general	class	of	methods	to	identify	mentalizing	which	make	use	of	an	opaque	barrier	to	determine	the	ability	to	represent	what	another	perceives.	Barrier	methods	compare	behavior	in	two	situations:	when	in	the	presence	of	another	agent	with	full	visual	access	to	the	environment,	and	when	in	the	presence	of	an	agent	whose	view	of	the	environment	is	blocked	by	an	opaque	barrier.	In	the	goggles	version	of	the	test,	participants	first	learn	a	conditional	discrimination	between	two	colored	goggles,	one	of	which	affords	seeing	and	the	other	not.	Participants	learn	the	affordances	of	the	goggles	through	their	own	experience	with	them.	A	transfer	test	then	follows	where	the	goggles	are	placed	on	another	individual	and	participants	have	to	extrapolate	from	their	own	experience	to	infer	what	can	be	seen	through	each	pair	of	goggles.			 It	could	be	argued,	however,	that	successful	performance	on	the	goggles	test	does	not	provide	an	unequivocal	demonstration	of	mentalizing.	In	common	with	other	barrier	methods,	if	a	participant	has	repeated	experience	of	opaque	
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barriers,	they	may	learn	that	when	barriers	are	placed	between	an	object	and	another	individual	then	that	individual	does	not	interact	with	the	object.	This	experience	may	allow	them	to	act	as	if	they	realize	that	the	individual	does	not	see	the	object,	and	that	therefore	the	individual	does	not	know	it	is	there,	but	does	not	require	the	participant	to	represent	the	other’s	mental	state	(Penn	&	Povinelli,	2007).	One	therefore	needs	to	extend	the	goggles	logic	so	that	the	participant	encounters	two	situations	in	which	an	agent	views	a	scene	through	transparent	barriers,	so	that	past	experience	suggests	that	the	barrier	affords	seeing,	but	where	one	of	the	barriers	renders	a	specific	object	invisible.	This	situation	has	been	impossible	to	instantiate	until	now,	but	recent	advances	in	the	development	of	‘cloaking	devices’	to	render	objects	invisible	(Choi	&	Howell,	2014)	make	it	possible.		 Therefore	in	Experiment	1,	rather	than	giving	participants	experience	of	transparent	and	opaque	goggles,	we	used	two	‘telescopes’	within	a	cloaking	device.	The	lenses	in	both	telescopes	were	transparent,	however	due	to	their	respective	focal	lengths	it	was	possible	to	manipulate	an	object’s	visibility.	An	object	placed	at	a	specific	distance	from	the	focal	point	of	the	‘invisible	telescope’	was	invisible,	even	though	other	objects	not	placed	at	that	point	were	visible.	All	objects	were	visible	when	viewed	through	the	‘visible	telescope’	because	its	lens	had	a	different	focal	length.	This	cloaking	device	allowed	us	to	maintain	transparency	across	conditions	while	manipulating	the	visibility	of	a	specific	object:	in	this	case,	the	red	dots	in	the	dot	perspective	task.	The	use	of	such	a	novel	apparatus	within	the	dot	perspective	task	means	that	previous	experience	
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of	how	people	interact	with	objects	placed	behind	an	opaque	barrier	cannot	explain	any	modulation	of	the	consistency	effect	by	the	visibility	of	the	dots,	and	allows	the	inferred	mental	state	of	the	avatar	to	be	manipulated	while	holding	all	other	task	and	stimulus	features	constant.	The	use	of	two	telescopes,	both	with	transparent	lenses,	one	of	which	renders	certain	objects	invisible,	allows	for	precise	manipulation	of	specific	mental	state	content	(i.e.	what	is	seen).	In	addition,	and	unlike	the	goggles	manipulation,	the	fact	that	participants	do	not	have	previous	experience	of	transparent	materials	able	to	render	specific	objects	invisible	means	that	any	non-mentalistic	explanation	of	their	potential	impact	on	the	consistency	effect	based	on	prior	learning	becomes	untenable.			Problems	with	prior	experience	of	opacity	notwithstanding,	two	recent	studies	used	variants	of	the	goggles	test	in	order	to	determine	whether	automatic	mentalizing	underpins	performance	in	the	avatar	condition	of	the	dot	perspective	task.	Cole,	Atkinson,	Le,	and	Smith	(2016)	inserted	either	a	transparent	barrier	or	an	opaque	barrier	in	front	of	the	avatar	stimulus.	This	design	provides	a	test	of	the	automatic	mentalizing	hypothesis	as	if	the	consistency	effect	is	due	to	the	representation	of	the	avatar’s	visual	perspective,	then	the	consistency	effect	should	be	modulated	by	anything	that	modulates	the	avatar’s	visual	perspective	(such	as	the	opacity	of	the	barrier).	Counter	to	the	hypothesis	that	automatic	mentalizing	underlies	performance	on	the	standard	version	of	the	task,	participants	demonstrated	an	equivalent	consistency	effect	for	both	types	of	barrier.		
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Furlanetto,	Becchio,	Samson	and	Apperly	(2016)	also	implemented	a	variant	of	the	goggles	procedure	in	which	they	instructed	participants	as	to	the	properties	of	two	pairs	of	goggles,	one	of	which	was	transparent	and	one	opaque,	before	allowing	them	to	experience	the	difference	themselves.	They	then	administered	the	standard	version	of	the	dot	perspective	task	with	the	addition	of	conditions	in	which	the	avatar	wore	either	the	opaque	or	transparent	goggles.	Participants	demonstrated	a	consistency	effect	when	the	avatar	wore	transparent	goggles,	but	not	when	the	avatar	wore	opaque	goggles;	results	which	are	consistent	with	an	automatic	mentalizing	interpretation.			The	contrasting	results	between	the	Cole	and	Furlanetto	studies	can	potentially	be	explained	by	a	crucial	methodological	difference	relating	to	the	judgments	participants	were	required	to	make	during	the	dot	perspective	task.	It	has	long	been	acknowledged	that	the	‘acid	test’	of	automatic	mentalizing	in	this	task	occurs	when	participants	are	required	to	verify	whether	the	number	cue	matches	the	number	of	dots	visible	from	their	own	perspective	only	(as	used	by	Cole	et	al.,	2016).	Here,	any	effect	of	the	avatar	meets	a	strict	definition	of	automatic	in	which	even	though	participants	are	never	required	to	judge	the	number	of	dots	visible	from	the	avatar’s	perspective,	and	doing	so	hinders	performance	of	the	instructed	task,	their	performance	is	nevertheless	influenced	by	the	avatar.			Other	variants	of	the	dot	perspective	task	have	required	participants	to	verify	the	number	cue	from	both	their	own	and	the	avatar’s	perspective	(as	used	
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by	Furlanetto	et	al.,	2016).	The	requirement	to	adopt	both	perspectives	significantly	weakens	the	claim	for	automaticity,	as	participants	may	experience	task	carry-over	effects	on	own-perspective	trials	from	avatar-perspective	trials	(Samson	et	al.,	2010,	p.	1259;	Santiesteban	et	al.,	2014,	p.	934;	Schurz	et	al.,	2015,	p.	387).	Such	an	effect	would	be	automatic	in	the	sense	that	adoption	of	the	avatar’s	perspective	on	own-perspective	trials	is	task-irrelevant	and	interferes	with	performance,	but	the	automaticity	would	be	an	artifact	of	the	testing	situation	rather	than	a	general	feature	of	human	cognition.	Thus,	it	is	possible	that	Furlanetto	et	al.	have	shown	that	a	carry-over	effect	of	explicit,	non-automatic	mentalizing	on	the	avatar-perspective	trials	modulates	the	consistency	effect	on	self-perspective	trials;	however,	what	process	is	being	modulated	cannot	be	determined	by	their	design:	it	could	be	either	automatic	mentalizing	or	a	domain-general	process.			Experiments	2	and	3	were	designed	to	investigate	this	task	carry-over	explanation	of	the	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016)	result.	Experiment	2	repeated	the	Furlanetto	study	using	their	exact	design,	stimuli,	and	procedure	but	with	one	key	variation:	participants	were	asked	to	respond	from	their	own	perspective	only	and	never	from	the	avatar’s	perspective.	Experiment	3	was	a	replication	of	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016),	in	which	participants	responded	from	both	their	own	and	the	avatar’s	perspective.	Comparison	of	the	results	of	Experiment	2	and	Experiment	3	allows	a	task	carry-over	effect	to	be	identified	if	it	is	present.			
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In	sum,	the	current	experiments	utilized	two	different	visibility	manipulations	embedded	in	the	dot	perspective	task	in	order	to	determine	whether	the	consistency	effect	is	modulated	by	the	avatar’s	inferred	mental	state.	In	contrast	to	the	Cole	and	Furlanetto	studies	described	above,	in	Experiment	1	participants	were	not	instructed	about	the	properties	of	the	telescopes,	instead	they	discovered	their	properties	through	self-discovery	only	(as	per	Heyes,	2014b).	In	addition,	in	Experiments	1	and	2	only	own-perspective	trials	were	used	in	order	to	limit	the	potential	for	task	carry-over	effects	to	explain	the	results.	Experiment	3	included	both	self-	and	other-perspective	trials	in	order	to	determine	whether	the	process	underpinning	the	consistency	effect	is	modulated	by	a	task	carry-over	effect	of	explicit,	non-automatic,	mentalizing.				
Experiment	1		 Experiment	1	implemented	a	variant	on	the	dot	perspective	task	designed	such	that,	should	evidence	of	mentalizing	be	observed,	this	evidence	could	not	be	explained	by	submentalizing	factors	related	to	domain-general	processes	or	task	carry-over	effects.	This	aim	was	achieved	through	the	use	of	two	clear	glass	‘telescopes’	and	the	addition	of	an	arrow	stimulus	as	used	by	Santiesteban	et	al.	(2014).				 Participants	were	given	real	life	experience	of	the	two	telescopes,	one	visible	and	one	invisible,	in	a	blue	room	with	red	dots	on	the	wall.	Participants	could	see	the	red	dots	through	the	visible	telescope,	but	not	through	the	invisible	telescope.	Participants	then	completed	the	dot	perspective	task	with	the	
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12	
telescopes	inserted	in	front	of	the	avatar	and	arrow	stimuli.	If	participants	represent	what	the	avatar	can	see,	one	would	expect	a	consistency	effect	when	the	avatar	is	looking	through	the	visible	telescope	because	on	consistent	trials	there	is	no	conflict	between	the	participant’s	and	avatar’s	perspectives,	but	on	inconsistent	trials	responding	should	be	slowed	due	to	the	conflict	in	perspectives.	However,	a	consistency	effect	would	not	be	expected	with	the	invisible	telescope	because	even	when	the	number	of	dots	visible	to	the	participant	equals	the	number	of	dots	in	front	of	the	avatar	(‘consistent	trials’),	the	avatar	cannot	see	the	red	dots	through	the	invisible	telescope	and	therefore	the	participant’s	and	the	avatar’s	perspectives	are	always	in	conflict.	In	effect,	the	use	of	the	invisible	telescope	means	that	all	trials	are	inconsistent,	and	therefore	that	response	times	(RTs)	on	‘consistent’	and	inconsistent	trials	should	be	equivalent.	As	the	arrow	is	not	an	appropriate	target	for	the	attribution	of	mental	states,	no	consistency	effect	should	be	observed	with	this	stimulus,	regardless	of	telescope	type.		 In	contrast,	if	the	consistency	effect	in	the	dot	perspective	task	is	due	to	non-mentalistic	domain-general	processes,	such	as	the	directionality	of	the	stimulus,	then	one	would	expect	to	observe	a	consistency	effect	for	both	the	visible	and	invisible	telescope	in	both	the	avatar	and	arrow	conditions,	providing	that	the	addition	of	the	telescope	stimulus	does	not	impact	on	the	relevant	cue	characteristic	(such	as	the	directionality	of	either	stimulus).		
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Method	
Participants.	Forty-nine	healthy	adults	volunteered	to	take	part	in	this	experiment	in	return	for	a	small	monetary	sum.	Data	from	six	participants	were	excluded	from	the	analysis,	3	due	to	a	technical	fault	and	a	further	3	due	to	being	outliers	with	respect	to	accuracy	(error	rate	>	25%).	The	remaining	43	participants	(37	female)	were	aged	between	17	and	48	(M	=	25.72,	SD	=	7.57).	The	data-stopping	rule	and	sample	size	were	determined	prior	to	data	collection	and	were	based	on	previous	research.	The	target	sample	size	was	three	times	(n	=	48)	the	size	of	the	original	dot	perspective	task	study	(Samson	et	al.,	2010;	n	=	16).		 	
Stimuli	and	Apparatus.	
Cloaking	device.	A	real-life	replica	of	the	blue	room	from	the	computer	stimuli	of	the	dot	perspective	task	was	built.	This	room	measured	275mm	high	by	370mm	wide	and	was	situated	on	an	adjustable	stand	so	participants	could	place	their	head	inside	the	room	while	standing.	A	telescope	mount	was	placed	in	the	center	of	the	room,	150mm	from	its	back	wall.	In	the	center	of	the	back	wall	there	was	a	porthole	of	45mm	diameter	where	acetates	with	red	dots	on	them	could	be	placed.	The	red	dots	had	a	diameter	of	8mm,	and	there	were	3	different	acetates,	with	1,	2,	and	3	dots	on	them	respectively.			 A	white	screen	was	placed	above	the	room’s	back	wall	to	occlude	the	rest	of	the	device	from	the	participant’s	view.	A	50mm	diameter	achromatic	doublet	lens	of	focal	length	200mm	was	placed	behind	this	screen	in	line	with	the	
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porthole	and	255.5mm	from	the	position	of	the	telescope	mount.	A	blue	screen,	matched	in	color	to	the	room,	was	placed	150mm	from	this	lens.	As	the	red	dots	were	placed	on	clear	acetates,	this	blue	screen	acted	as	a	background	so	the	dots	appeared	as	if	they	were	on	the	back	wall	of	the	blue	room.			 Four	telescopes	were	used,	each	comprising	a	50mm	diameter	achromatic	doublet	lens	attached	to	a	3-inch	aluminium	lens	tube.	There	were	two	pairs	of	telescopes.	In	each	pair,	the	invisible	telescope	had	a	focal	length	of	75mm	and	the	visible	telescope	had	a	focal	length	of	200mm.	To	distinguish	the	telescopes	in	each	pair,	they	were	covered	in	yellow	or	green	card.	Telescope	color	was	counterbalanced	across	participants.			 The	set-up	of	the	cloaking	device	meant	that	when	the	visible	telescope	was	placed	on	its	mount	in	the	blue	room	apparatus,	it	was	possible	to	see	the	red	dots	against	the	blue	background	when	looking	through	the	telescope;	whereas	when	the	invisible	telescope	was	in	place,	only	the	blue	background	was	visible	when	looking	through	the	telescope,	the	red	dots	were	invisible	(see	Choi	&	Howell,	2014;	Figure	1;	Figure	S.1;	and	Videos	S.1	and	S.2	in	Supplemental	Materials	for	details).					 Computerized	dot	perspective	task.	The	computer	stimuli	were	based	on	those	used	in	Santiesteban	et	al.	(2014;	Experiment	2),	which	were	adapted	from	the	original	task	images	used	by	Samson	et	al.	(2010;	Experiment	3).	A	central	stimulus	was	presented	in	the	middle	of	a	blue	room	facing	either	to	the	right	or	
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left.	On	some	trials	the	stimulus	was	a	human	avatar	and	on	others	it	was	an	arrow.	The	avatar	and	the	arrow	were	matched	in	height,	area,	and	color.	There	were	two	versions	of	each	avatar	and	arrow:	one	‘male’	and	one	‘female’.	Participants	viewed	the	central	stimulus	that	matched	their	own	gender.	Our	stimuli	differed	from	Santiesteban	et	al.	(2014;	Experiment	2)	in	one	respect:	we	inserted	the	green	or	yellow	telescope	into	each	image	type	(see	Figure	1).	On	each	trial,	the	green	or	yellow	telescope	appeared	at	the	point	of	the	arrow	or	at	the	eye	of	the	avatar.	Different	configurations	of	red	dots	appeared	on	the	front	and	back	walls	of	the	blue	room.	The	possible	number	and	configurations	of	dots	were:	1	in	front	(F)	or	behind	(B);	2F;	1F	&	1B;	2B;	3F;	1F	&	2B;	2F	&	1B;	3B	(Santiesteban	et	al.,	2014).	Participants	completed	the	task	on	a	laptop	computer,	and	used	the	‘K’	key	(marked	with	a	‘1’)	to	indicate	a	‘YES’	response	and	the	‘L’	key	(marked	with	a	‘2’)	to	indicate	a	‘NO’	response.			
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Figure	1.	Examples	of	the	Cloaking	Device	and	Computer	Stimuli	in		
Experiment	1	
	
Figure	1.	Panel	a	(top)	shows	the	blue	room	apparatus	with	one	red	dot	present	and	that	the	red	dot	is	seen	through	the	visible	telescope	(panel	a	bottom	left),	but	not	the	invisible	telescope	(panel	a	bottom	right).	Sample	avatar	and	arrow	stimuli	with	the	telescopes	for	the	computerized	dot	perspective	task	are	depicted	in	panel	b.	See	Supplemental	Materials	(Fig.	S.1)	and	Choi	&	Howell	(2014)	for	a	full	explanation	of	the	invisibility	effect.			
	
Procedure.	
Telescope	familiarization.	Two	telescopes	of	200mm	focal	length,	one	green	and	one	yellow,	were	placed	on	a	table	in	the	testing	room.	The	experimenter	held	up	both	telescopes	and	said,	“Here	are	two	telescopes,	a	green	
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telescope	and	a	yellow	telescope.	Take	a	look	through	them”.	At	this	stage,	the	two	telescopes	were	of	the	same	focal	length	so	the	difference	in	lens	strength	could	not	be	detected.	Participants	could	look	around	the	testing	room	at	anything	they	chose.	After	participants	had	examined	each	telescope,	the	experimenter	asked	them	if	they	could	see	through	each	one,	and	then	instructed	them	to	carry	both	telescopes	to	the	blue	room	apparatus	which	was	situated	in	a	separate	cubicle	within	the	testing	room.	Participants	were	asked	to	choose	which	telescope	they	would	like	to	look	through	first.	The	experimenter	placed	the	chosen	telescope	in	the	mount.	The	invisible	telescope	was	covertly	swapped	for	an	identical	telescope	with	a	focal	length	of	75mm	(post-test	debriefing	revealed	that	no	participant	was	aware	of	this	switch).	The	experimenter	then	presented	the	3	acetates	with	red	dots	to	the	participant	for	them	to	choose	which	order	to	view	them	in.	The	experimenter	placed	the	first	acetate	on	the	back	wall	of	the	blue	room	and,	while	standing	behind	the	participant,	instructed	them	to	look	through	the	telescope.	These	steps	were	repeated	for	each	of	the	3	acetates	for	both	the	visible	and	the	invisible	telescope.	Then,	participants	were	asked	to	report	what	they	thought	the	difference	between	the	two	telescopes	was.	This	part	of	the	procedure	was	video	recorded.	Following	this,	participants	left	the	cubicle	to	complete	the	computerized	task.			
Dot	perspective	task.	A	fixation	cross	was	shown	(1250	ms)	at	the	start	of	each	trial,	followed	by	the	word	‘YOU’	(1250	ms)	to	indicate	that	the	participant	should	judge	how	many	dots	they	can	see	from	their	own	perspective;	then	a	number	cue	between	0	and	3	appeared	(750	ms),	followed	by	
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an	image	of	the	blue	room.	Participants	were	instructed	to	press	‘1’	if	the	number	cue	matched	the	number	of	dots	they	could	see	in	the	image	of	the	blue	room,	and	‘2’	if	the	number	cue	did	not	match	the	number	of	dots	they	could	see	in	the	image.	Participants	were	moved	automatically	onto	the	next	trial	once	they	made	a	response	or	after	2000	ms.			 Apart	from	the	inclusion	of	the	telescope	stimuli,	the	experimental	design	was	the	same	as	that	used	in	Santiesteban	et	al.	(2014;	Experiment	2)	and	Samson	et	al.	(2010;	Experiment	3),	with	one	further	exception:	the	number	of	blocks	was	doubled	to	achieve	the	same	number	of	trials	per	cell	of	the	design	as	in	these	previous	studies.	Thus,	participants	completed	8	blocks	of	52	trials	each.	Four	trials	in	each	block	were	filler	trials	in	which	no	dots	appeared.	On	half	of	the	remaining	trials,	the	avatar	appeared	and	on	half	of	these	avatar	trials	the	green	telescope	was	present	and	on	the	other	half	the	yellow	telescope	was	present.	The	arrow	was	present	on	the	remaining	trials,	half	with	the	green	telescope	and	half	with	the	yellow.	Half	of	the	total	non-filler	trials	were	‘inconsistent’	and	the	other	half	‘consistent’;	half	required	a	‘YES’	response	and	the	other	half	a	‘NO’	response;	and	on	half	the	central	stimulus	faced	left	and	on	the	other	half	faced	right.	Trial	types	were	therefore	balanced	across	blocks.	Trial	order	was	pseudo-randomized	prior	to	testing	in	order	to	fulfill	a	rule	that	a	similar	trial	type	should	not	occur	three	consecutive	times	(Samson	et	al.,	2010).	Block	order	was	randomized	per	participant.	Participants	first	completed	a	practice	block	of	26	trials	with	accuracy	feedback.	No	feedback	was	given	on	the	experimental	trials.		
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Manipulation	check.	Following	the	8	experimental	blocks,	participants	completed	a	further	12	trials	in	which	they	were	presented	with	images	of	the	blue	room	with	the	avatar	stimulus.	On	half	of	these	trials	the	yellow	telescope	was	present	and	on	the	other	half	the	green	telescope	was	present;	half	of	the	trials	were	inconsistent	and	the	other	half	were	consistent.	Different	numbers	and	configurations	of	red	dots	were	presented	on	each	trial.	Participants	were	asked	to	respond	by	pressing	the	keys	0/1/2/3	to	indicate	a	response	to	the	question:	“How	many	dots	can	the	woman/man	see	through	the	green/yellow	
telescope?”		
Results	
Analysis	Strategy.	In	keeping	with	previous	studies,	reaction	time	data	were	analyzed	from	‘YES’	trials	with	correct	responses	only,	using	a	2	x	2	x	2	repeated	measures	ANOVA	with	within-subjects	factors	of	Consistency	(Consistent	vs	Inconsistent),	Stimulus	(Avatar	vs	Arrow),	and	Telescope	Type	(Visible	vs	Invisible).	The	total	number	of	errors	was	low	(M	error	rate		=	3%)	and	so	accuracy	data	are	reported	in	the	Supplemental	Materials;	where	effects	are	significant	in	the	error	data	they	are	consistent	with	the	reaction	time	data,	providing	no	evidence	for	speed-accuracy	trade-offs.	Results	were	also	analyzed	within	a	Bayesian	framework	using	JASP	(https://jasp-stats.org;	JASP	Team,	2016),	in	order	to	examine	the	strength	of	the	evidence	in	favor	of	the	null	and	experimental	hypotheses.	Bayes	Factors	are	particularly	relevant	to	the	current	analyses	as	they	provide	a	ratio	of	the	likelihood	of	the	observed	data	under	the	null	vs	alternative	hypothesis,	whereas	p-values	examine	the	probability	of	the	
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data	given	the	null	hypothesis	and	therefore	cannot	discriminate	between	evidence	for	the	null	and	no	evidence	for	either	the	null	or	alternative	hypothesis	(Dienes,	2015).	Bayes	Factors	(BF01)	are	reported	below,	where	values	approaching	zero	indicate	that	the	data	provide	more	evidence	in	favor	of	the	alternative	hypothesis	than	the	null	hypothesis,	a	value	of	1	indicates	that	the	null	and	alternative	hypotheses	are	equally	likely	given	the	data,	and	values	above	1	indicate	greater	support	for	the	null	hypothesis.	By	convention	values	<	1/3	and	>	3	are	taken	as	evidence	in	favor	of	the	alternative	and	null	hypotheses,	respectively,	while	values	within	these	boundaries	are	judged	to	provide	no	evidence	to	favor	either	the	null	or	alternative	hypotheses.				
Reaction	Time	Data.	There	was	a	main	effect	of	Consistency,	F	(1,42)	=	32.87,	p	<	.001,	ηρ2	=	.439,	BF01	=	4.024	x	10-14,	whereby	reaction	times	(in	ms)	were	significantly	faster	on	consistent	trials	(M	=	514,	SE	=	15,	CI	[483,	544])	than	on	inconsistent	trials	(M	=	549,	SE	=	19,	CI	[511,	587].	There	was	also	a	main	effect	of	Stimulus,	F	(1,42)	=	4.39,	p	=	.042,	ηρ2	=	.095;	reaction	times	were	significantly	slower	on	trials	on	which	the	avatar	was	the	central	stimulus	(M	=	535,	SE	=	17,	CI	[500,	570])	rather	than	the	arrow	(M	=	528,	SE	=	16,	CI	[495,	560]),	but	this	was	qualified	by	the	fact	that	the	Bayesian	analysis	found	no	support	for	either	the	null	or	alternative	hypothesis	(BF01	=	1.737).	The	Consistency	x	Stimulus	interaction	was	also	significant,	F	(1,42)	=	6.89,	p	=	.012,	ηρ2	=	.141,	but	again	the	Bayesian	analysis	indicated	no	support	for	either	the	null	or	alternative	hypothesis	(BF01	=	1.182).	It	should	also	be	noted	that	after	controlling	for	the	overall	difference	in	reaction	time	between	stimuli,	this	
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interaction	was	no	longer	significant	(F	(1,41)	=	3.18,	p	=	.08,	ηρ2	=	.072).	Crucially,	a	consistency	effect	was	found	for	both	the	avatar	stimulus	(F	(1,42)	=	31.73,	p	<	.001,	ηρ2	=	.430,	BF01	=	2.411	x	10-8)	and	the	arrow	stimulus	(F	(1,42)	=	21.84,	p	<	.001,	ηρ2	=	.342,	BF01	=	8.056	x	10-5).	If	the	inanimate	arrow	stimulus	can	produce	a	consistency	effect,	then	one	cannot	rely	on	the	simple	presence	of	a	consistency	effect	as	evidence	for	automatic	mentalizing,	as	an	arrow	cannot	‘see’	the	dots	and	does	not	have	mental	states.				Evidence	of	mentalizing	would	be	obtained	however,	if	the	consistency	effect	varies	as	a	function	of	Telescope	Type	for	the	avatar	but	not	the	arrow.		The	crucial	statistics	that	would	indicate	evidence	of	automatic	mentalizing	are	a	significant	3-way	interaction	between	Consistency	x	Stimulus	x	Telescope	Type,	or,	less	convincingly,	a	significant	Consistency	x	Telescope	Type	interaction	in	the	avatar	condition	only.	No	such	evidence	of	automatic	mentalizing	was	found	however.	The	consistency	effect	did	not	vary	as	a	function	of	Telescope	Type	and	Stimulus	(Consistency	x	Stimulus	x	Telescope	Type:	F	(1,42)	=	0.63,	p	=	.43,	ηρ2	=	.015,	BF01	=	4.293),	and	in	the	avatar	condition	there	was	no	effect	of	Telescope	Type	on	the	consistency	effect	(Consistency	x	Telescope	Type:	F	(1,42)	=	0.48,	p	=	.49,	ηρ2	=	.011,	BF01	=	3.959)	(means,	standard	errors,	and	95%	confidence	intervals	for	these	data	are	presented	in	Table	S.1.	in	Supplemental	Materials).	As	can	be	seen,	the	Bayes	Factors	provide	support	for	the	null	over	the	alternative	hypothesis	in	each	case.	Indeed,	in	the	avatar	condition,	the	consistency	effect	was	numerically	larger	in	the	invisible	telescope	condition	
Running	Head:	SUBMENTALIZING	OR	MENTALIZING:	A	CLOAK	AND	GOGGLES	TEST		
		
	
22	
than	in	the	visible	telescope	condition	–	a	pattern	opposite	to	that	which	would	be	predicted	on	the	basis	of	automatic	mentalizing	(see	Figure	2).		
	
Figure	2.	Mean	Consistency	Effect	for	Each	Stimulus	and	Telescope	Type	in	
Experiment	1	
	
Figure	2.	Error	bars	show	the	Standard	Error	of	the	Mean.	
	
Confirmatory	Analysis.	The	logic	of	the	telescope	addition	to	the	dot	perspective	task	requires	participants	to	be	aware	of	the	nature	of	each	telescope.	If	participants	should	forget	the	fact	that	one	telescope	does	not	allow	the	red	dots	to	be	seen,	or	forget	the	mappings	between	telescope	type	and	color,	then	it	is	possible	that	a	Consistency	x	Stimulus	x	Telescope	Type	interaction	would	not	be	seen	even	if	participants	were	automatically	mentalizing.	
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Accordingly,	a	very	strict	criterion	was	adopted	such	that	only	participants	who	correctly	reported	the	difference	between	telescopes	at	the	start	of	the	experiment,	and	who	responded	correctly	on	12	out	of	12	of	the	explicit	questions	at	the	end	of	the	procedure	(n=21)	were	included.	These	participants	were	explicitly	aware	of	the	nature	of	the	telescopes,	and	which	telescope	afforded	seeing	the	red	dots	and	which	not,	at	the	start	and	end	of	the	experiment.	Even	among	this	highly	selected	set	neither	the	Consistency	x	Stimulus	x	Telescope	Type	interaction	(F	(1,20)	=	0.02,	p	=	.88,	ηρ2	=	.001,	BF01	=	3.272),	nor	the	Consistency	x	Telescope	Type	interaction	within	the	avatar	condition	(F	(1,20)	=	0.02,	p	=	.89,	ηρ2	=	.001,	BF01	=	3.273),	was	significant.			
Discussion			 The	introduction	of	visible	and	invisible	telescopes	to	the	dot	perspective	taking	task	allowed	a	clear	prediction	to	be	made:	if	participants	were	automatically	representing	the	avatar’s	mental	state	then	a	consistency	effect	should	have	been	observed	when	the	avatar	was	able	to	see	through	the	visible	telescope,	but	not	when	the	avatar	was	faced	with	the	invisible	telescope,	nor	when	the	avatar	was	replaced	with	the	arrow	stimulus,	regardless	of	which	telescope	accompanied	it.	Instead,	a	significant	consistency	effect	was	observed	in	all	four	conditions.	Indeed,	the	consistency	effect	was	numerically	larger	when	the	avatar	looked	through	the	invisible	telescope	than	when	it	looked	through	the	visible	telescope,	a	pattern	of	data	opposite	to	that	predicted	by	the	automatic	mentalizing	account.	While	such	a	pattern	of	results	is	not	consistent	with	the	automatic	mentalizing	hypothesis,	it	is	also	inconsistent	with	the	results	
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obtained	by	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016).	Experiments	2	and	3	investigate	a	potential	explanation	for	this	latter	inconsistency.	
	
Experiment	2	Experiment	1	found	no	evidence	of	automatic	mentalizing	in	the	dot	perspective	taking	task	using	a	visibility	manipulation	instantiated	using	a	cloaking	device	to	render	the	dots	invisible.	As	outlined	above,	these	results	are	in	direct	contrast	to	those	obtained	by	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016)	who	used	visible	and	invisible	goggles	to	perform	a	conceptually	similar	experiment.	We	speculated	that	a	possible	reason	for	this	discrepancy	relates	to	the	participants’	task	throughout	the	experiment.	In	Experiment	1	participants	were	required	to	verify	whether	the	number	cue	matched	the	number	of	dots	visible	from	their	perspective	only.	In	contrast,	participants	in	the	study	of	Furlanetto	et	al.	were	asked	to	respond	on	the	basis	of	both	their	own	and	the	avatar’s	perspective.	This	feature	of	the	Furlanetto	study	makes	it	possible	that	effects	of	the	avatar’s	perspective	on	own	perspective	trials	were	due	to	a	task	carry-over	effect;	that	as	a	result	of	repeated	demands	to	adopt	the	avatar’s	perspective	during	the	task,	participants	began	to	do	so	even	on	trials	where	it	was	not	required.	Experiment	2	tested	for	this	possibility	by	implementing	the	Furlanetto	procedure	without	avatar-perspective	trials.	Accordingly,	participants	were	given	experience	of	two	pairs	of	goggles,	one	with	transparent	lenses	through	which	they	could	see	and	the	other	with	opaque	lenses	through	which	they	could	not	see.	Participants	then	completed	the	dot	perspective	task	with	the	avatar	stimulus	both	without	goggles	and	with	opaque	and	transparent	goggles.	
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If	the	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016)	effect	is	truly	due	to	automatic	mentalizing	then	one	would	expect	the	consistency	effect	to	vary	as	a	function	of	goggle	type.	Specifically,	automatic	mentalizing	would	be	revealed	by	a	consistency	effect	being	observed	when	the	avatar	is	wearing	the	transparent	goggles	and	when	wearing	no	goggles,	but	crucially	not	when	wearing	the	opaque	goggles.	In	contrast,	if	the	modulation	of	the	consistency	effect	by	goggle	type	observed	on	own-perspective	trials	in	the	Furlanetto	study	was	due	to	a	task	carry-over	effect,	then	it	should	not	be	evident	when	participants	respond	on	the	basis	of	their	own	perspective	only.	Observation	of	a	consistency	effect	in	all	three	goggle	conditions,	including	the	crucial	opaque	condition,	would	indicate	that	the	consistency	effect	in	the	dot	perspective	task	is	due	to	non-mentalistic	domain-general	processes,	such	as	the	directionality	of	the	stimulus,	and	not	automatic	mentalizing.			 Experiment	2	provided	a	further	check	on	the	generalizability	of	the	results	of	Experiment	1.	It	could	be	argued	that	the	cloaking	device	manipulation	used	in	Experiment	1	is	sufficiently	novel,	or	sufficiently	outside	typical	experience,	that	the	automatic	mentalizing	system	cannot	represent	the	way	in	which	it	alters	visual	experience.	Although	the	Confirmatory	Analysis	reported	in	Experiment	1	demonstrated	that	no	sign	of	implicit	mentalizing	was	observed	in	participants	who	we	could	be	sure	understood	the	visibility	manipulation,	the	proportion	of	participants	able	to	meet	the	strict	understanding	criterion	used	in	this	analysis	was	surprisingly	low.	The	use	in	Experiment	2	of	transparent	and	opaque	goggles,	stimuli	with	which	participants	are	likely	to	have	much	greater	
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experience,	should	alleviate	the	concern	that	the	visibility	manipulation	is	outside	the	realm	in	which	the	automatic	mentalizing	system	can	operate.		
	
Method	
Participants.	Sixty-six	healthy	adults	volunteered	to	take	part	in	this	experiment	in	return	for	a	small	monetary	sum.	Data	from	nine	participants	were	excluded	from	the	analysis;	4	because	they	did	not	follow	instructions,	and	a	further	5	due	to	being	outliers	with	respect	to	accuracy	(error	rate	>	25%).	The	remaining	57	participants	(45	female)	were	aged	between	18	and	56	(M	=	23.37,	
SD	=	5.67).	The	data-stopping	rule	and	sample	size	were	determined	prior	to	data	collection	and	were	based	on	previous	research.	The	target	sample	size	was	three	times	(n	=	54)	the	size	of	the	sample	in	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016;	n	=	18);	see	Simonsohn	(2015)	for	discussion	of	the	desirability	of	a	sample	at	least	2.5	times	that	of	the	original	study	when	attempting	to	replicate	an	effect.					The	same	participants	completed	experiments	2	and	3.	Experiment	order	was	randomly	assigned	(Experiment	2	first:	n	=	36;	Experiment	3	first:	n	=	21).	As	there	were	no	effects	of	experiment	order,	and	results	for	both	experiments	analyzed	separately	for	each	order	were	consistent	with	findings	from	the	total	sample,	these	samples	were	combined	and	data	from	the	total	sample	are	reported.					
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Stimuli	and	Apparatus.	
Goggles.	Four	pairs	of	goggles	(two	red	and	two	orange)	that	matched	the	computerized	stimuli	from	Furlanetto	et	al.’s	(2016)	study	were	used.	The	external	lenses	in	all	goggles	were	mirrored	so	that	a	person’s	eyes	could	not	be	seen	through	them.	The	internal	lens	in	one	red	and	one	orange	pair	of	goggles	was	covered	with	a	blackout	material	so	that	they	became	opaque.	The	lenses	in	the	other	two	pairs	of	goggles	were	unaltered	and	therefore	remained	transparent.	The	transparent	and	opaque	goggles	were	indistinguishable	when	viewed	externally.		
	
Computerized	dot	perspective	task.	The	computer	stimuli	were	the	exact	same	stimuli	as	those	used	in	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016).	The	Furlanetto	task	was	similar	to	that	outlined	in	Experiment	1	except	that:	the	room	was	grey	and	white	with	blue	dots;	the	female	avatar	had	a	different	physical	appearance;	the	fixation	cross	and	word	cue	were	shown	for	750ms	each	with	a	500ms	inter-stimulus	interval;	there	was	no	arrow	stimulus	in	this	task;	and	the	avatar	appeared	wearing	either	red,	orange,	or	no	goggles.	Goggle	type	(transparent	or	opaque)	was	blocked,	whereas	whether	the	avatar	was	wearing	goggles	or	no	goggles	was	intermixed	within	a	block,	as	per	Furlanetto	et	al.	Sample	stimuli	are	depicted	in	Figure	3.					
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Figure	3.	Examples	of	the	Computer	Stimuli	in	Experiments	2	and	3	
	
Figure	3.	Sample	avatar	stimuli	from	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016)	with	the	red	(panel	a),	orange	(panel	b),	and	no	goggles	(panel	c)	for	the	computerized	dot	perspective	task	in	Experiments	2	and	3.
	
Procedure.	
Belief	Induction.	Participants	were	instructed	on-screen	before	the	transparent	goggle	condition,	that	‘In	this	block	the	woman/man	will	sometimes	
wear	orange	/	red	goggles,	so	she/he	will	be	able	to	see	what	is	on	the	wall	in	front	
of	her/him’,	or	before	the	opaque	goggle	condition,	that	‘…so	she/he	will	not	be	
able	to	see	what	is	on	the	wall	in	front	of	her/him’.	Following	this,	they	were	instructed	‘Now	you	will	get	first	person	experience	of	the	visual	experience	of	the	
woman/man’.		The	experimenter	then	gave	the	participant	the	goggle	type	corresponding	to	the	forthcoming	condition	(opaque	or	transparent)	and	asked	the	participant	to	look	in	the	direction	of	the	monitor	for	one	minute.	There	were	two	separate	belief	inductions,	one	for	each	goggle	type	prior	to	the	onset	of	both	blocks	for	that	condition	(i.e.	prior	to	the	start	of	Block	1	and	Block	3).			
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Dot	perspective	task.	The	presentation	of	the	dot	task	was	the	same	as	that	described	in	Experiment	1	except	for	the	following	changes.		As	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016)	used	6	blocks	of	trials	in	total	and	had	an	additional	factor	that	was	not	included	in	Experiment	2	(i.e.	other-perspective	trials	on	which	participants	had	to	respond	based	on	the	avatar’s	perspective),	the	current	experiment	used	the	self-perspective	trials	from	their	study	(comprising	3	blocks	of	trials)	and	added	an	additional	block	in	order	to	have	an	equal	number	for	both	the	opaque	and	transparent	goggles	conditions	(4	blocks	in	total).			There	were	200	test	trials	in	total,	presented	in	four	blocks	of	50	trials	(2	filler	trials	per	block).		Half	of	the	trials	in	each	block	were	consistent	and	the	other	half	were	inconsistent,	half	of	the	trials	were	matching	(i.e.	the	number	cue	matched	the	number	of	dots	participants	could	see	in	the	image	of	the	room)	and	the	other	half	mismatching	(i.e.	the	number	cue	did	not	match	the	number	of	dots	participants	could	see	in	the	image	of	the	room).		Within	each	block	33%	of	trials	showed	the	avatar	stimulus	without	any	goggles	and	66%	of	trials	showed	the	avatar	wearing	either	the	red	or	orange	goggles.	In	contrast	to	Experiment	1,	goggle	type	(opaque	or	transparent)	was	never	intermixed	within	blocks.	Block	order,	opacity	order,	and	goggle	color	were	counterbalanced	between	participants.			As	in	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016),	participants	first	completed	26	practice	trials	with	feedback	on	trials	on	which	the	avatar	stimulus	had	no	goggles.	No	feedback	was	given	on	test	trials.	After	the	first	belief	induction	phase	
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participants	completed	the	two	blocks	associated	with	that	goggle	condition,	then	received	the	second	belief	induction	prior	to	commencing	the	final	two	blocks	with	the	other	goggle	condition	(e.g.	two	blocks	with	opaque	goggles	followed	by	two	blocks	with	transparent	goggles	or	vice	versa).	Between	each	of	the	four	blocks	participants	were	verbally	reminded	on-screen	whether	in	the	upcoming	block	the	woman	or	man	‘will	/	will	not	be	able	to	see	what	is	on	the	
wall	in	front	of	her/him’.		
Manipulation	check.	Participants	were	asked	to	choose	a	pair	of	goggles	to	wear	while	performing	a	visual	search	task.		As	in	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016),	all	participants	chose	the	transparent	goggles.			
Results	
Analysis	Strategy.	As	in	previous	studies,	reaction	time	data	were	analyzed	from	‘YES’	trials	with	correct	responses	only,	using	a	2	x	3	repeated	measures	ANOVA	with	within-subjects	factors	of	Consistency	(Consistent	vs	Inconsistent)	and	Goggle	Type	(No	Goggles	vs	Transparent	Goggles	vs	Opaque	Goggles).	The	total	number	of	errors	was	low	(M	error	rate		=	3.3%)	and	so	accuracy	data	are	reported	in	the	Supplemental	Materials;	all	significant	effects	in	the	error	data	are	consistent	with	the	reaction	time	data.	Where	sphericity	assumptions	were	violated,	Greenhouse-Geisser	corrected	values	are	reported.		 	Reaction	Time	Data.	There	was	a	main	effect	of	Consistency,	F	(1,56)	=	72.81,	p	<	.001,	ηρ2	=	.565,	BF01	=	2.259	x	10-10,	whereby	reaction	times	(in	ms)	
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were	significantly	faster	on	consistent	trials	(M	=	523,	SE	=	11,	CI	[501,	545])	than	on	inconsistent	trials	(M	=	559,	SE	=	13,	CI	[534,	584]).	There	was	no	main	effect	of	Goggle	Type,	F	(2,112)	=	1.90,	p	=	.15,	ηρ2	=	.033,	BF01	=	3.751.	The	Consistency	x	Goggle	Type	interaction	was	significant,	F	(2,112)	=	4.58,	p	=	.012,	ηρ2	=	.076,	BF01	=	1.378,	although	the	Bayesian	analysis	provided	no	support	for	this	effect.	The	Consistency	x	Goggle	Type	interaction	was	due	to	a	significantly	greater	consistency	effect	in	the	Opaque	(M	=	49,	SE	=	8)	than	in	the	Transparent		(M	=	22,	SE	=	6)	condition	(Meandiff	=	28,	SE	=	9,	p	=	.013),	while	no	other	comparison	was	significant	(Opaque	vs	No	Goggles:	Meandiff	=	14,	SE	=	9,	p	=	.424;	Transparent	vs	No	Goggles:	Meandiff	=	-14,	SE	=	9,	p	=	.375).			These	data	do	not	support	an	automatic	mentalizing	hypothesis,	under	which	a	consistency	effect	would	be	expected	only	in	the	conditions	with	the	transparent	goggles	and	no	goggles.	Indeed,	the	significantly	greater	consistency	effect	observed	when	the	avatar	wore	Opaque	versus	Transparent	goggles	is	directly	opposite	to	what	would	be	expected	under	the	automatic	mentalizing	account.	The	lack	of	support	for	automatic	mentalizing	is	evidenced	by	a	significant	consistency	effect	in	all	three	conditions:	when	the	avatar	was	wearing	no	goggles	(F	(1,56)	=	34.36,	p	<	.001,	ηρ2	=	.380,	BF01	=	2.435	x	10-5),	transparent	goggles	(F	(1,56)	=	13.12,	p	=	.001,	ηρ2	=	.190,	BF01	=	0.025),	and,	crucially,	opaque	goggles	(F	(1,56)	=	38.18,	p		<	.001,	ηρ2	=	.405,	BF01	=	8.198	x	10-
6)	(see	Figure	4).	Means,	standard	errors,	and	95%	confidence	intervals	for	these	data	are	presented	in	Table	S.2.	in	Supplemental	Materials.		
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Discussion		The	results	of	Experiment	2	provide	no	support	for	the	hypothesis	that	automatic	mentalizing	is	responsible	for	the	consistency	effect	in	the	dot	perspective	task.	Instead,	like	the	results	of	Experiment	1	and	Cole	et	al.	(2016),	they	are	consistent	with	a	submentalizing	perspective	in	which	domain-general	processes	such	as	attentional	orienting	underpin	the	consistency	effect.	Furthermore,	alleviating	any	concerns	that	the	cloaking	device	visibility	manipulation	in	Experiment	1	was	too	novel	or	obtuse	for	the	automatic	mentalizing	system	to	deal	with,	results	were	obtained	with	familiar	materials	in	a	familiar	situation,	and	with	explicit	instructions	as	to	the	properties	of	the	goggles.		
Figure	4.	Mean	Consistency	Effect	for	Each	Goggle	Type	in	Experiment	2	
	
Figure	4.	Error	bars	show	the	Standard	Error	of	the	Mean.	
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Experiment	3	The	results	of	Experiment	2	are	consistent	with	the	hypothesis	that	the	positive	evidence	of	automatic	mentalizing	reported	by	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016)	is	a	task-specific	product	of	a	design	in	which	participants	are	asked	to	adopt	both	their	own	perspective	and	that	of	the	avatar.	In	order	to	further	test	this	hypothesis,	the	participants	from	Experiment	2	also	completed	Experiment	3,	which	consisted	of	a	straight	replication	of	the	Furlanetto	et	al.	study	including	both	self	and	avatar	perspective	trials.	Comparison	of	the	results	of	Experiment	2	and	3	will	therefore	enable	the	identification	of	a	task	carry-over	effect	should	one	exist.	Evidence	that	the	submentalizing	process	underpinning	the	consistency	effect	on	self-perspective	trials	can	be	moderated	by	a	carry-over	effect	of	explicit,	non-automatic	mentalizing	on	avatar-perspective	trials	would	be	demonstrated	by	the	observation	of	a	consistency	effect	in	the	crucial	opaque	goggles	condition	on	self-perspective	trials	in	Experiment	3.			Experiments	2	and	3	also	investigated	individual	differences	in	the	size	of	the	consistency	effect.	A	recent	paper	found	that,	on	self-perspective	trials,	the	consistency	effect	in	the	avatar	condition	was	positively	correlated	with	the	perspective-taking	and	empathic	concern	subscales	of	the	self-report	‘Interpersonal	Reactivity	Index’	questionnaire	(IRI:	Davis,	1983),	whereas	the	consistency	effect	in	an	arrow,	and	a	rectangular	stimulus	condition	showed	no	such	relationships	(Nielsen,	Slade,	Levy,	&	Holmes,	2015).	Nielsen	et	al	suggested	that	these	results	imply	that	consistency	effects	in	the	avatar	condition	reflect	distinctly	social	processes	that	do	not	operate	when	consistency	effects	are	
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observed	with	non-social	stimuli.	Participants	in	the	current	experiments	(2	and	3)	also	completed	the	IRI	to	investigate	whether	the	consistency	effect	in	the	avatar	condition	varies	according	to	empathy	and	perspective-taking.	
	
Method		 The	method	for	Experiment	3	was	the	same	as	that	for	Experiment	2	with	the	following	exceptions	described	below	and	was	an	exact	replication	of	that	of	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016),	using	the	same	stimuli,	design,	and	procedure.			
	 Dot	perspective	task.	There	were	300	test	trials	presented	in	six	blocks	of	50	trials	(including	2	filler	trials	per	block).	There	were	3	blocks	per	goggle	condition.		There	was	an	additional	factor	of	Perspective	with	2	levels,	Self	and	Other.	Half	of	all	trials	were	Self	and	the	other	half	were	Other	trials.	The	word	cue		‘YOU’	indicated	that	the	participant	should	judge	how	many	dots	they	can	see	from	their	own	perspective	(as	in	Experiments	1	and	2),	the	word	cue	‘SHE	/	HE’	indicated	that	the	participant	should	judge	how	many	dots	the	avatar	can	see	from	the	avatar’s	perspective.	Self	and	Other	trials	were	intermixed	within	blocks.				 Interpersonal	Reactivity	Index.	On	completion	of	the	study,	participants	were	asked	to	complete	the	perspective-taking	(PT)	and	empathic	concern	(EC)	subscales	of	the	IRI	via	an	online	link	to	the	questionnaire.	Each	subscale	had	7-items	scored	on	a	5-point	Likert	scale	(0	=	‘does	not	describe	me	well’;	4	=	‘describes	me	very	well’),	and	measured	the	tendency	to	adopt	others’	point	of	
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view	(PT:	α	=	.72),	and	have	concern	or	compassionate	feelings	for	others	(EC:	α	=	.78)	(Davis,	1983).	Sample	items	included	“when	I	am	upset	at	someone,	I	usually	try	to	‘put	myself	in	his	shoes’	for	a	while”	(PT),	and	“I	would	describe	myself	as	a	pretty	soft-hearted	person”	(EC).			
Results	
Analysis	Strategy.	As	in	previous	studies,	reaction	time	data	were	analyzed	from	‘YES’	trials	with	correct	responses	only,	using	a	2	x	2	x	3	repeated	measures	ANOVA	with	within-subjects	factors	of	Consistency	(Consistent	vs	Inconsistent),	Perspective	(Self	vs	Other),	and	Goggle	Type	(No	Goggles	vs	Transparent	Goggles	vs	Opaque	Goggles).	The	total	number	of	errors	was	low	(M	
error	rate		=	6.4%)	and	so	accuracy	data	are	reported	in	the	Supplemental	Materials;	where	effects	are	significant	in	the	error	data	they	are	consistent	with	the	reaction	time	data.	Where	sphericity	assumptions	were	violated,	Greenhouse-Geisser	corrected	values	are	reported.			The	relationship	between	the	consistency	effects	and	the	perspective-taking	and	empathic	concern	subscales	of	the	IRI	were	examined	as	in	the	study	by	Nielsen	et	al	(2015),	using	one-tailed	Pearson’s	correlations,	and	using	Bayesian	correlations.	Analyses	were	conducted	for	both	overall	consistency	effects	and	by	goggle	type	for	the	self-perspective	trials	from	Experiment	2	and	Experiment	3	separately,	and	the	other-perspective	trials	from	Experiment	3.		
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Reaction	Time	Data.	There	was	a	main	effect	of	Consistency,	F	(1,56)	=	75.01,	p	<	.001,	ηρ2	=	.573,	BF01	=	1.029	x	10-11,	whereby	reaction	times	(in	ms)	were	significantly	faster	on	consistent	trials	(M	=	602,	SE	=	15,	CI	[573,	632])	than	on	inconsistent	trials	(M	=	660,	SE	=	19,	CI	[622,	697]).	There	was	also	a	main	effect	of	Perspective,	F	(1,56)	=	39.69,	p	<	.001,	ηρ2	=	.415,	BF01	=2.575	x	10-9,	with	faster	responding	on	Self	trials	(M	=	605,	SE	=	16,	CI	[573,	637])	than	on	Other	trials	(M	=	657,	SE	=	18,	CI	[621,	692]).	The	Consistency	x	Perspective	interaction	was	significant,	F	(1,56)	=	11.22,	p	=	.001,	ηρ2	=	.167,	BF01	=0.064,	with	a	larger	consistency	effect	in	the	Other	condition	(M	=	80,	SE	=	10,	CI	[61,	99])	than	the	Self	condition	(M	=	35,	SE	=	9,	CI	[16,	53]).	There	was	a	significant	Consistency	x	Perspective	x	Goggle	Type	interaction,	F	(1.6,	92.2)	=	4.86,	p	=	.015,	ηρ2	=	.080,	BF01	=	0.631,	which	was	not	supported	by	the	Bayesian	analysis.			The	Consistency	x	Perspective	x	Goggle	Type	interaction	was	driven	by	a	Consistency	x	Goggle	Type	interaction	that	was	significant	in	the	Other	condition,	
F	(2,	112)	=	6.042,	p	=	.003,	ηρ2	=	.097,	BF01	=	0.285,	driven	in	turn	by	the	fact	that	the	consistency	effect	in	the	Opaque	Goggles	Other	condition	was	significantly	smaller	than	in	the	Transparent	Goggles	Other	condition	(F	(1,	56)	=	5.74,	p	=	.020,	ηρ2	=	.093,	BF01	=	1.140)	and	than	in	the	No	Goggles	Other	condition	(F	(1,	56)	=	9.18,	p	=	.004,	ηρ2	=	.141,	BF01	=	0.376),	although	neither	of	these	simple	contrasts	were	supported	by	the	Bayesian	analysis	(see	Figure	5).	The	difference	in	the	size	of	the	consistency	effect	between	the	Transparent	Goggles	Other	and	No	Goggles	Other	conditions	was	not	significant,	(F	(1,	56)	=	0.555,	p	=	.459,	ηρ2	=	.010,	BF01	=	4.241).		
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The	consistency	effect	observed	on	such	Other	perspective	trials,	i.e.	when	judging	the	avatar’s	perspective,	is	an	example	of	egocentric	intrusion	(Samson	et	al.,	2010).	On	these	trials	the	participant	is	explicitly	instructed	to	adopt	the	avatar’s	perspective	and	they	are	slower	to	do	so	when	the	avatar’s	perspective	is	inconsistent	with	their	own	than	when	it	is	consistent.	While	this	effect	is	interesting,	it	does	not	bear	upon	whether	the	avatar’s	perspective	is	automatically	represented	on	self-perspective	trials.	The	reduction	in	the	egocentric	intrusion	effect	with	opaque	goggles	is	encouraging	however,	as	it	suggests	that,	when	explicitly	instructed	to	adopt	the	avatar’s	perspective,	participants	were	representing	that	the	avatar	could	not	see	any	dots	when	wearing	the	opaque	goggles.	Therefore	what	were	previously	‘consistent’	trials	were	now	in	fact	inconsistent,	as	when	wearing	opaque	goggles	the	avatar	never	saw	any	dots	on	the	wall	it	was	facing	whereas	the	participant	did	on	all	‘consistent’	trials	that	were	not	filler	trials	(note	that	on	filler	trials	no	dots	appeared;	12/300	trials	were	fillers	and	these	were	not	analyzed).	Therefore	for	all	of	the	‘consistent’	trials	analyzed	in	the	opaque	goggle	condition,	the	avatar’s	and	participant’s	perspectives	were	conflicting,	thus	slowing	responding.			 In	contrast,	on	Self-Perspective	trials	the	Consistency	x	Goggle	Type	interaction	was	not	significant,	F	(2,	112)	=	0.48,	p	=	.619,	ηρ2	=	.009,	BF01	=	12.643.	The	consistency	effect	did	not	vary	as	a	function	of	goggle	type,	and	there	was	a	significant	consistency	effect	in	the	Opaque	Goggles	Self	condition	(F	(1,	56)	=	10.58,	p	=	.002,	ηρ2	=	.159,	BF01	=	0.064),	in	the	Transparent	Goggles	Self	condition	(F	(1,	56)	=	5.434,	p	=	.023,	ηρ2	=	.088,	BF01	=0.505),	and	a	marginally	
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significant	effect	in	the	No	Goggles	Self	condition	(F	(1,	56)	=	3.00,	p	=	.089,	ηρ2	=	.051,	BF01	=	1.398)	(see	Figure	5).	Note	that	of	the	consistency	effects	in	the	individual	conditions,	only	that	in	the	Opaque	Self	condition	was	supported	by	the	Bayesian	analysis,	and	the	Bayesian	analysis	provided	strong	support	for	the	lack	of	any	effect	of	Goggle	Type	on	consistency.		Means,	standard	errors,	and	95%	confidence	intervals	for	these	data	are	presented	in	Table	S.3.	in	Supplemental	Materials.		The	self-perspective	trials	from	Experiment	3	and	Experiment	2	(which	included	only	self-perspective	trials)	were	compared	to	examine	whether	the	Consistency	x	Goggle	Type	interaction	varied	as	a	function	of	Experiment.	However,	the	Consistency	x	Goggle	Type	x	Experiment	interaction	was	not	significant,	(F	(2,	112)	=	0.762,	p	=	.469,	ηρ2	=	.013,	BF01	=	11.923),	providing	no	evidence	that	task	carry-over	effects	influence	the	consistency	effect.		
	
Interpersonal	Reactivity	Index.	Forty-five	participants	responded	to	the	questionnaire.		In	the	full	data	set,	there	were	no	significant	correlations	(all	
ps	>	.05).	In	a	reduced	data	set	(n	=	35),	from	which	outliers	were	removed	using	the	1.5	inter-quartile	range	rule	(Tukey,	1977),	the	only	significant	correlation	observed	prior	to	correcting	for	multiple	testing	was	a	positive	relationship	between	empathic	concern	and	the	consistency	effect	on	other-perspective	trials	in	the	no	goggles	condition,	r	=	.35,	p	=	.02.	The	interpretation	of	this	correlation	is	unclear,	as	in	the	conceptually	similar	transparent	goggles	condition	(in	which	the	avatar	can	also	‘see’)	it	was	not	observed,	r	=	-.04,	p	=	.41.	After	correcting	for	
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multiple	comparisons	it	no	longer	reached	significance.	Bayesian	analyses	showed	no	support	for	any	correlations	in	both	the	full	and	reduced	data	set.		It	is	clear	therefore,	that	these	results	do	not	support	those	observed	by	Nielsen	et	al	(2015).			
Discussion		Experiment	3	represented	a	replication	of	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016)	with	greater	power	to	detect	any	effects,	if	present.	Despite	this,	it	was	not	possible	to	replicate	the	original	results;	the	magnitude	of	the	consistency	effect	on	self-perspective	trials	was	not	modulated	as	a	function	of	whether	the	avatar	was	wearing	transparent	or	opaque	goggles.	In	contrast,	strong	evidence	was	obtained	from	the	Bayesian	analysis	of	this	data	that	the	consistency	effect	was	
not	modulated	by	which	goggles	the	avatar	was	wearing.	That	the	avatar’s	visual	perspective	was	manipulated	without	any	effect	on	participants’	responding	on	self-perspective	trials	indicates	that	automatic	representation	of	the	avatar’s	mental	state	does	not	generate	the	consistency	effect.			The	cross-experimental	comparison,	demonstrating	that	the	consistency	effect	by	goggle	type	interaction	on	self-perspective	trials	is	similar	in	both	the	self-perspective-only	experiment	(2)	and	in	the	self	condition	from	the	mixed-perspective	experiment	(3),	suggests	that	in	Experiment	3,	the	consistency	effect	on	self-perspective	trials	was	not	affected	by	task	carry-over	effects	from	other-perspective	trials.	Given	our	larger	sample	size,	our	results	are	therefore	more	
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consistent	with	those	from	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016)	reflecting	a	false	positive,	rather	than	being	due	to	carry-over	effects.				In	contrast	to	the	findings	of	Nielsen	et	al,	these	data	showed	no	relationship	between	empathic	concern	or	perspective-taking	and	the	consistency	effect.	The	data	therefore	do	not	support	the	claim	that	consistency	effects	for	avatar	stimuli	involve	specific	mentalistic,	or	general	social,	processes.			
Figure	5.	Mean	Consistency	Effect	for	Each	Perspective	and	Goggle	Type	in	
Experiment	3	
	
Figure	5.	Error	bars	show	the	Standard	Error	of	the	Mean.	
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4.	General	Discussion	The	novel	invisibility	manipulation	used	in	Experiment	1	allowed	us	to	develop	an	experimental	paradigm	in	which,	should	evidence	consistent	with	automatic	mentalizing	have	been	found,	one	could	reasonably	claim	that	a	submentalizing	process	could	not	have	been	responsible	for	the	observed	results.	In	contrast,	we	found	no	evidence	that	participants	were	automatically	representing	what	the	avatar	can	see	in	the	dot	perspective	task.	Whether	the	avatar	was	looking	through	a	telescope	through	which	they	either	could,	or	could	not,	see	the	red	dots	made	no	difference	to	the	size	of	the	consistency	effect,	a	finding	which	runs	counter	to	any	explanation	of	the	consistency	effect	being	due	to	the	representation	of	what	the	avatar	can	see.	Similarly,	replicating	Santiesteban	et	al.	(2014),	a	consistency	effect	was	also	observed	for	the	arrow	stimulus.	Furthermore,	our	re-examination	of	the	design	and	procedure	used	by	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016)	found	no	support	for	the	claim	that	ascription	of	mental	states	underpins	the	consistency	effect,	nor	for	the	possibility	that	this	effect	could	be	modulated	by	a	task	carry-over	effect	of	explicit	mentalizing	(Experiments	2	and	3).		Together	these	findings	suggest	that	domain-general	non-mentalistic	processes,	such	as	automatic	directional	cueing,	underpin	the	consistency	effect	previously	found	using	the	dot	perspective	task.			The	current	Experiments	2	and	3	also	showed	no	relationship	between	the	size	of	the	consistency	effect	and	individual	differences	in	empathic	concern	or	perspective-taking,	and	therefore	do	not	support	the	suggestion	by	Nielsen	et	al	(2015)	that	consistency	effects	in	the	avatar	condition	reflect	distinctly	social	
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processes.	As	further	support	of	this	claim,	Nielsen	et	al	also	pointed	to	a	significantly	larger	consistency	effect	on	self-perspective	trials	in	the	avatar	(i.e.	social)	condition	compared	to	two	non-social	conditions	(an	arrow	and	a	rectangle).	However,	the	avatar	stimulus	was	significantly	larger	than	the	arrow	and	rectangle	stimuli,	which	were	comparable	in	size,	and	therefore	it	is	possible	that	the	larger	consistency	effect	in	the	avatar	condition	was	a	result	of	the	size	of	the	central	stimulus	rather	than	its	social	aspects.	This	confound,	and	the	lack	of	replication	in	the	current	experiments,	suggests	that	processes	underlying	the	consistency	effect	are	not	social	in	nature.			 In	the	automatic	(or	‘implicit’)	mentalizing	literature,	a	distinction	is	often	made	between	‘Level	1’	and	‘Level	2’	perspective	taking,	where	Level	1	refers	to	the	ability	to	“infer	what	object	another	person	does	and	does	not	see”	(Flavell,	Abrahams	Everett,	Croft,	&	Flavell,	1981,	p.	99),	and	Level	2	refers	to	knowing	“that	an	object	simultaneously	visible	to	both	the	self	and	the	other	person	may	
nonetheless	give	rise	to	different	visual	impressions	or	experiences	in	the	two	if	
their	viewing	circumstances	differ”	(Flavell	et	al.,	1981,	p.99).	Level	1	perspective	taking	thus	concerns	the	visibility	of	an	object,	while	Level	2	perspective	taking	concerns	its	appearance.	It	has	been	claimed	that	the	automatic	and	efficient	route	to	belief	or	belief-like	state	representation	is	limited	to	Level	1	perspective	taking	only	(Surtees,	Butterfill,	&	Apperly,	2012;	Qureshi	et	al.,	2010;	Apperly	&	Butterfill,	2009;	Butterfill	&	Apperly,	2013).	The	dot	task	is	a	measure	of	Level	1	perspective	taking	as,	under	the	mentalizing	account,	the	consistency	effect	depends	on	inferring	that	the	avatar	does	see	the	dots	on	the	wall	in	front	of	
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them	but	does	not	see	the	dots	on	the	wall	behind	them	(Furlanetto	et	al.,	2016;	Surtees,	Butterfill,	&	Apperly,	2012;	Samson	et	al.,	2010;	Qureshi	et	al.,	2010;	Apperly	&	Butterfill,	2009).			 Crucially,	the	introduction	of	a	visibility	manipulation,	as	in	the	current	studies	and	in	the	studies	by	Cole	et	al.	(2016)	and	Furlanetto	et	al.	(2016),	does	not	alter	the	level	of	perspective	taking	of	the	dot	task;	rather,	it	manipulates	Level	1	perspective	taking:	whether	another	person	can	see	an	object	seen	by	oneself.	The	invisible	telescope	does	not	change	the	appearance	of	the	dots	in	a	way	that	would	qualify	for	Level	2	perspective	taking	(e.g.	by	making	them	change	color	while	remaining	jointly	visible	to	both	avatar	and	participant).	The	invisible	telescope	changes	the	visibility	of	the	dots,	not	their	appearance,	therefore	allowing	a	manipulation	of	Level	1	perspective	taking.			The	current	experiments	add	to	an	emerging	literature	that	re-examines	claims	of	automatic	mentalizing	as	a	domain-specific	process	of	mental	state	representation	(Phillips	et	al.,	2015;	Santiesteban	et	al.,	2014;	Schneider,	Lam,	Bayliss,	&	Dux,	2012).	A	recent	re-examination	(Phillips	et	al.,	2015)	of	a	different	task,	first	used	to	support	claims	of	automatic	mentalizing	in	adults	and	7-month-old	infants	(Kovács	et	al.,	2010),	demonstrated	that	the	observed	effects	result	from	an	attention-check	rather	than	automatic	mentalizing.	The	current	Experiment	1	goes	beyond	the	analysis	of	existing	effects	however,	by	providing	a	manipulation	by	which	automatic	mentalizing	could	be	detected,	if	present.	Even	if	it	were	possible	that	automatic	mentalizing	might	occur	but	not	
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interfere	with	the	dot	task,	the	current	experiments	invalidate	the	mentalizing	interpretation	of	the	consistency	effect,	showing	it	is	not	caused	by	interference	from	spontaneous	computation	of	the	avatar’s	conflicting	visual	perspective.			 The	finding	that	mental	states	are	not	necessarily	represented	in	tasks	putatively	assumed	to	measure	automatic	mentalizing	has	profound	implications.	Evidence	of	automatic	mentalizing	has	been	used	in	support	of	claims	including	its	evolutionary	significance	as	a	uniquely	human	adaptation	(Kovács	et	al.,	2010),	specific	deficits	in	those	with	Autism	Spectrum	Disorder	(Senju,	Southgate,	White,	&	Frith,	2009),	and	the	presence	of	a	dual-process	system	for	mentalizing	(Apperly	&	Butterfill,	2009;	Apperly,	2011).	These	data	suggest	that	mentalizing	may	not	be	as	pervasive	as	previously	assumed	(Apperly,	2011).			Our	findings	also	contribute	to	the	intriguing	possibility	that	what	has	been	termed	‘automatic	mentalizing’	might	in	fact	be	entirely	accounted	for	by	domain-general	processes	and,	although	someone	may	act	as	if	they	understand	another	person’s	mental	state,	no	mental	states	are	actually	represented	(Heyes,	2014a).	This	opens	up	new	avenues	for	research	to	investigate	how	cultural	learning	may	underpin	the	development	of	a	full-blown	explicit	mentalizing	ability;	what	ontogenetic	experiences	enhance	or	impair	this	ability;	and	what	factors,	such	as	motivation	or	intelligence,	influence	individual	differences	in	the	degree	of	mentalizing	skill	and	the	degree	to	which	this	skill	is	applied	in	everyday	life.	
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Supplemental	Material	
Figure	S.1.		Schematic	diagram	of	the	cloaking	device	in	Experiment	1	
	
Figure	S.1.	A	diagram	of	the	cloaking	device.	The	dashed	line	represents	the	outline	of	the	blue	room.	Participants	looked	horizontally	through	the	system	from	the	left	hand	side	of	the	diagram.	Distances	x1	=	255.5mm	and	x2	=	150mm.	
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The	telescope	was	placed	on	a	mount.	A	high	white	screen	was	situated	behind	the	back	of	the	blue	room	so	that	the	remaining	apparatus	was	occluded	from	the	participant’s	view.	A	45mm	diameter	circular	hole	was	cut	into	this	white	screen	and	the	back	wall	of	the	blue	room.	Transparent	acetates	with	opaque	red	dots	were	placed	on	the	back	wall	of	the	blue	room	so	that	they	appeared	within	this	circle.	A	blue	screen	was	situated	at	the	end	of	the	system	to	act	as	the	background	when	looking	through	the	system.	Figure	S.1.1	shows	the	region	cloaked	by	the	invisible	telescope	(75mm	focal	length).	The	red	dot	falls	within	the	cloaked	region	when	viewed	through	the	invisible	telescope	and	therefore	cannot	be	seen	(see	also	Video	S.2).	Figure	S.1.2	shows	the	region	cloaked	by	the	visible	telescope	(200mm	focal	length).	The	red	dot	does	not	fall	within	the	cloaked	region	when	viewed	through	the	visible	telescope	and	therefore	can	be	seen	(see	also	Video	S.1	and	Choi	&	Howell,	2014	for	further	details).		
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Table	S.1.		
Experiment	1	Means	(M),	Standard	Errors	(SE)	and	95%	Confidence	Intervals	(CI)	
for	Reaction	Time	Data,	in	milliseconds,	for	each	Trial	Type.		 Consistent	 	 Inconsistent	
	 M	 SE	 95%	CI	 	 M	 SE	 95%	CI	
Telescope	Type	 Avatar	Visible	 514	 15	 [483,	545]	 	 554	 20	 [514,	594]	Invisible	 512	 16	 [481,	544]	 	 560	 22	 [516,	604]	
	 Arrow	Visible	 512	 14	 [484,	541]	 	 543	 19	 [504,	581]	Invisible	 515	 17	 [482,	549]	 	 541	 17	 [506,	576]	
	
Table	S.2.		
Experiment	2	Means	(M),	Standard	Errors	(SE)	and	95%	Confidence	Intervals	(CI)	
for	Reaction	Time	Data,	in	milliseconds,	for	each	Trial	Type.		 Consistent	 	 Inconsistent	
	 M	 SE	 95%	CI	 	 M	 SE	 95%	CI	
Goggle	Type	 Self	Opaque	 512	 10	 [491,	533]	 	 561	 15	 [532,	591]	Transparent	 538	 13	 [513,	564]	 	 560	 14	 [532,	587]	None	 520	 12	 [496,	544]	 	 555	 13	 [530,	581]		
Running	Head:	SUBMENTALIZING	OR	MENTALIZING:	A	CLOAK	AND	GOGGLES	TEST		
		
	
53	
Table	S.3.		
Experiment	3	Means	(M),	Standard	Errors	(SE)	and	95%	Confidence	Intervals	(CI)	
for	Reaction	Time	Data,	in	milliseconds,	for	each	Trial	Type.		 Consistent	 	 Inconsistent	
	 M	 SE	 95%	CI	 	 M	 SE	 95%	CI	
Goggle	Type	 Self	Opaque	 589	 19	 [551,	626]	 	 632	 22	 [588,	675]	Transparent	 584	 14	 [556,	612]	 	 620	 22	 [576,	663]	None	 591	 17	 [558,	624]	 	 616	 20	 [577,	656]	
	 Other	Opaque	 650	 26	 [598,	701]	 	 690	 30	 [630,	749]	Transparent	 589	 15	 [559,	620]	 	 684	 19	 [647,	721]	None	 611	 15	 [580,	641]	 	 717	 20	 [677,	757]	
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Accuracy	Data	
Table	S.4.		
Experiment	1	Accuracy	Results	from	Repeated	Measures	ANOVA	with	Factors	
Consistency,	Stimulus,	and	Telescope	Type.			 F	 p	 ηρ2	 BF01	
Consistency	 15.10	 <	.001	 .264	 0.006	Stimulus	 1.60	 .213	 .037	 4.234	Telescope	Type	 0.973	 .329	 .023	 4.729	Consistency	x	Stimulus	 0.258	 .614	 .006	 5.538	Consistency	x	Telescope	Type	 3.540	 .067	 .078	 1.200	Stimulus	x	Telescope	Type	 0.328	 .570	 .008	 5.610	Consistency	x	Stimulus	x	Telescope	Type	 0.006	 .938	 .000	 4.361	
Note.	Consistency	x	Telescope	Type	in	the	Avatar	condition:	F	(1,42)	=	1.40	p	=	.244,	ηρ2	=	.032,	BF01	=	2.308;	and	in	the	Arrow	condition:	F	(1,42)	=	2.54,	p	=	.119,	ηρ2	=	.057,	BF01	=	4.152.									
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Figure	S.2.		Experiment	1	Mean	Number	of	Errors	for	Each	Consistency,	
Stimulus	and	Telescope	Type	
	
Figure	S.2.	Error	bars	show	the	Standard	Error	of	the	Mean.	
	
Table	S.5.		
Experiment	2	Accuracy	Results	from	Repeated	Measures	ANOVA	with	Factors	
Consistency,	and	Goggle	Type.			 F	 p	 ηρ2	 BF01	
Consistency	 10.58	 .002	 .159	 0.020	Goggle	Type	 0.633	 .516	 .011	 19.485	Consistency	x	Goggle	Type	 3.323	 .040	 .056	 0.864	
Note.	Consistency	x	Goggle	Type	for	Opaque	vs	Transparent	Goggles:	F	(1,56)	=	2.603,	p	=	.112,	ηρ2	=	.044,	BF01	=	1.382;	Opaque	vs	No	Goggles:	F	(1,56)	=	6.871,	p	=	.011,	ηρ2	=	.109,	BF01	=	2.405;	and	Transparent	vs	No	Goggles:	F	(1,56)	=	0.665,	p	=	.418,	ηρ2	=	.012,	BF01	=	1.973.		
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Figure	S.3.		Experiment	2	Mean	Number	of	Errors	for	Each	Consistency	and	
Goggle	Type		
	
Figure	S.3.	Error	bars	show	the	Standard	Error	of	the	Mean.											
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Table	S.6.		
Experiment	3	Accuracy	Results	from	Repeated	Measures	ANOVA	with	Factors	
Consistency,	Perspective,	and	Goggle	Type.			 F	 p	 ηρ2	 BF01	
Consistency	 21.61	 <	.001	 .278	 2.295	x	10-8	Perspective	 24.26	 <	.001	 .302	 3.675	x	10-6	Goggle	Type	 7.10	 .001	 .112	 0.052	Consistency	x	Perspective	 0.17	 .682	 .003	 8.629	Consistency	x	Goggle	Type	 13.40	 <	.001	 .193	 0.037	Perspective	x	Goggle	Type	 5.11	 .007	 .084	 0.530	Consistency	x	Perspective	x	Goggle	Type	 14.14	 <	.001	 .202	 0.007	
Note.	Consistency	x	Goggle	Type	in	the	Self	condition:	F	(2,112)	=	0.828,	p	=	.440,	ηρ2	=	.015,	BF01	=	10.545;	and	in	the	Other	condition:	Consistency	X	Goggle	Type:	
F	(2,112)	=	19.84,	p	<	.001,	ηρ2	=	.262,	BF01	=	4.621	x	10-4.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Running	Head:	SUBMENTALIZING	OR	MENTALIZING:	A	CLOAK	AND	GOGGLES	TEST		
		
	
58	
Figure	S.4.		Experiment	3	Mean	Number	of	Errors	for	Each	Consistency,	
Perspective,	and	Goggle	Type	
	
Figure	S.4.	Error	bars	show	the	Standard	Error	of	the	Mean.	
